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STUDYING THE ICEBERG FROM ITS TIP: A




JOHN J. DONOHUE III
Researchers often rely on published opinions to draw conclusions
about cases decided by the courts, determinants of court decisions,
and broader social phenomena. We demonstrate that 80 to 90 percent
of employment discrimination cases filed in federal court do not pro-
duce a published opinion. There are good theoretical reasons to be-
lieve that the process generating a published opinion is not random
and thus that samples of published cases will not be representative of
all cases. Through a direct comparison of published and unpublished
cases, we show that the two actually do differ in significant and pre-
dictable ways. Examining several studies that use cases with pub-
lished opinions for a variety of purposes, we show how our under-
standing of the operation of employment discrimination law
changes-in some instances, dramatically-when we look at all cases,
whether or not they have published opinions.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the few uncontested truths produced by the application
of social science to law is that only a tiny part of the "action" in
the legal system is revealed in appellate cases. Most potential dis-
putes never get defined by the actors as such, most actual disputes
don't go to court, most court cases are settled rather than adjudi-
cated, and most adjudicated cases are not appealed.' Moreover, at
We thank research assistants Dawn Jeglum Bartusch, Steven Martin, and
Kirsten Alesch Muth for their superb assistance with all phases of this highly
RA-intensive work. The staff at the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, especially Dave Cook, provided us with important data and was gener-
ous in answering our questions. The article benefited from helpful comments
by Ted Eisenberg, James Hughes, Vicki Schultz, and an anonymous referee.
Listing of the authors' names in reverse alphabetical order is a random event
in the course of their collaboration.
1 Miller and Sarat (1981: 544) describe a dispute-processing pyramid: the
broad, bottom layer is possible instances of conflict, while filing a legal claim is
at the top of the pyramid. (The share of grievances that go on to become liti-
gated cases with published opinions or appealed cases amounts in this analogy
to a few grains of sand on top of the point of the pyramid.)
The pyramid seems particularly "fat bottomed" in the substantive legal
area that will be the focus of this article-employment discrimination. That is,
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least since the pathbreaking work of Priest and Klein (1984),2 so-
cial scientists studying the law have come to appreciate that the
process by which parties select disputes for litigation or appeal will
not, in general, produce a random (representative) sample of all
disputes or cases. If appellate cases constitute only a fraction of the
population of disputes and potential disputes, and if that fraction is
not only minuscule, but systematically unrepresentative of the
larger population from which it is drawn, generalizing from such
cases to larger conclusions about law and/or society is hazardous.3
The unrepresentative nature of appellate cases is by now
widely accepted among social scientists. But a similar problem has
commanded far less attention: district court cases with published
opinions may be subject to the same kinds of sample selection
problems that confront users of appellate cases.4
among those who say they have experienced employment discrimination, a
smaller percentage go on to do anything about it--complain, see an attorney,
file suit-than for almost any other type of dispute. See, e.g., Curran (1977:
108, 135, 161); Miller and Sarat (1981: 545); Bumiller (1988); Kuhn (1987).
Without wishing to start a battle of the metaphors, we suggest that an ice-
berg is also an appropriate analogy for the sociolegal system: what is visible
above the metaphorical waterline are the readily accessible published cases,
but these constitute only a small portion of the object being studied.
2 A useful recent survey of the kinds of economic models of legal dis-
putes (including litigation and settlement behavior) that motivate our argu-
ment is Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989).
3 Priest and Klein (1984: 1) note:
Virtually all systematic knowledge of the legal system derives from
studies of appellate cases. Appellate cases, of course, provide the most
direct view of doctrinal developments in the law... [and] may tell us
which disputes courts find troublesome and which they find easy to
decide. But this doctrinal information discloses very little about how
legal rules affect the behavior of those subject to them or affect the
generation of legal disputes themselves.
Of course, appellate cases are worthy of study in their own right, since
they have an important influence on legal rules and on the construction of
legal consciousness. Suppose, for example, that Willie Griggs had settled with
the Duke Power Company rather than contesting its decision not to hire him.
If so, the Supreme Court might never have been confronted with a case involv-
ing practices implemented on the effective date of the Civil Rights Act in 1965
by a firm that freely admitted its discriminatory practices before 1965 (Griggs
v. Duke Power, 1971). Because the case did reach the Supreme Court, it
presented both the general public and the legal profession with a new defini-
tion of what "discrimination in employment" meant-the use of ostensibly
neutral job requirements that disqualify a disproportionate number of black
applicants was held to be discriminatory. A careful reading of Chief Justice
Burger's decision suggests that had the question arisen in a different factual
setting, the legal doctrine that emerged might have been far less momentous
(Gold, 1985).
Cast in terms of the pyramid of disputes described in Miller and Sarat
(1980-81), our theme is that while each level of the pyramid is worth studying
on its own, caution must be exercised in trying to generalize about one level of
the pyramid on the basis of information about another.
4 Some scholars make passing reference to the problem, although it
seems more common to ignore it altogether. Two recent papers, however, have
treated the broad set of issues we deal with here.
Olson (1989) does not discuss specific kinds of unrepresentativeness or
present a theoretical treatment. She does demonstrate convincingly that the
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The existence of specialized case reporters such as BNA's Fair
Employment Practice Cases Digest, the growth of computerized
legal research tools such as LEXIS and WESTLAW (see, e.g., Brenner,
1989), and the development of content analysis techniques have
made it relatively easy for social scientists to tap the rich source of
data contained in legal opinions. But if cases with published opin-
ions are systematically different from those without, such sources
and techniques need to be used with more caution than they have
been.
Our article attempts to determine how district court cases
with published opinions differ from those without them. We begin
in section II by confirming what most readers probably know al-
ready-the potential unrepresentativeness of cases with published
opinions is likely to be significant because only a few cases ever
leave a published record. In section III, we briefly discuss the defi-
nition of unrepresentativeness and then analyze the process by
potential for unrepresentativeness is high, given that few cases produce pub-
lished opinions. Surprisingly, she also finds that there is little relationship be-
tween attorneys' assessment of a case's importance and whether the case gen-
erates a published opinion.
Our article also echoes many of the themes in Eisenberg and Schwab
(1989). Although our basic methods and insights are similar, Eisenberg and
Schwab's purpose is slightly different from ours: to compare the perspective
that law professors and students develop by looking at published opinions with
the broader reality of all district court cases. As they put it (ibid., p. 535),
[i]t is not surprising that published [appellate] opinions offer a differ-
ent perspective . . . than do district court filings. Parties do not ran-
domly decide which cases to settle and which to continue through to
district court judgment. Nor do they randomly appeal these judg-
ments. Nor do judges randomly decide which of these appeals to pub-
lish. This filtering process... makes appellate opinions a biased sam-
ple of district court filings.
But our primary concern is how published district court decisions-which
as we will show are often used in social science research--differ from the
broader class of all district court filings.
Although we both focus on civil rights cases, Eisenberg and Schwab ex-
amine "constitutional torts" while we look at employment discrimination. We
both compare samples of cases with and without published opinions (although
they use appellate opinions, while we use those from district courts). We, too,
find that cases with written opinions are systematically different from those
without. Because of the differing objectives of the two studies, we consider a
broader set of variables in describing how published cases differ from unpub-
lished, and present a more integrated theoretical treatment of why non-
representativeness occurs. In addition, there are a number of significant differ-
ences in the precise method of sampling. We compare all employment
discrimination cases from a single district over a fifteen-year period based on
whether the case generated a published district court opinion. Eisenberg and
Schwab focused on a slightly larger class of cases in three districts, and com-
pared district court decisions for a single year (1980-81) with the encompassing
circuit courts of appeals' decisions over a five-year period (1980-85). Thus, our
study has the advantage of greater precision in terms of subject matter and in
having a precise geographic and temporal overlap between the two classes of
cases over a broader expanse of time, while their study has the advantage of
greater breadth in terms of subject matter and region over a more sharply fo-
cused time period.
Cartwright (1975) also discussed problems in using published cases but
concentrated on issues of ambiguous outcomes, missing data, and so on.
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which a published opinion is generated; section IV suggests the
ways in which cases with published opinions might differ from the
much larger body of cases in which no opinion is published. Sec-
tion V compares samples of district court cases with and without
published opinions to assess how such cases actually differ. We
conclude with a brief review of some of the ways in which social
scientists studying employment discrimination have used pub-
lished opinions, showing how a shift from published cases to all
cases can at times dramatically alter our understanding of employ-
ment discrimination law.
We focus for the most part on a single substantive area of fed-
eral law--employment discrimination-in order to make use of
what we already know about the factors that affect the volume
and composition of cases that get brought, the settlement rate, and
so on.5 We have already examined a rich source of data containing
the complete listing of all federal employment discrimination cases
filed over a fifteen-year period6 and have begun to analyze the
data from a random sample of some twelve hundred employment
discrimination case files.7 Thus, we have data that allow us to ex-
amine whether and how cases with district court published opin-
ions differ from other federal court cases.8
We will at times be critical of some of the uses to which (sam-
ples drawn from) employment discrimination cases with published
opinions have been put. We should therefore make it clear at the
outset that we are not opposed in principle to using cases with
published opinions (or appellate cases, or Supreme Court cases) to
conduct social research.9 Our main theme, however, is that the
5 For example, Donohue and Siegelman (1991) and Siegelman (1991)
demonstrate that the volume of employment discrimination cases filed, the
settlement rate in such litigation, and the plaintiff win rate are all sensitive to
the overall condition of the economy (as measured by the unemployment rate)
at the time a case is filed.
6 These data come from a tape compiled by the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts (AO) containing all 92,090 cases filed in federal district courts
under Code 442 (Civil Rights, Employment) between 1 July 1972 and 31 March
1987. For further details about this data source and an extensive analysis, see
Donohue and Siegelman (1991) or Siegelman (1991); Eisenberg (1989: 1574)
also contains useful information on the Administrative Office data.
7 A research project of the American Bar Foundation (ABF) is in the
process of compiling data coded from the original case files in these twelve
hundred cases, drawn from seven cities. In what follows, we will refer to this
data set as the ABF Survey.
8 Most of the analysis that follows will be limited to samples of cases with
and without published decisions in the Northern District of Illinois. We focus
on this single district largely for convenience, although it is the judicial district
with the largest volume of employment discrimination cases in the country.
9 We agree with Karl Llewellyn, who wrote that "the judicial opinion is a
human document and a fascinating record, there, for anybody's use. From the
standpoint of behavioral study these are data in which so many factors are
held equal as to outrun the results of an ordinary ten- or even hundred-thou-
sand dollar grant. All there. All waiting. Already gathered. Merely neglected"
(Cartwright, 1975: 369, citing Llewellyn, 1960: 514). Since Llewellyn was writ-
ing in 1960, his "ten- or... hundred-thousand dollar grant" would need to be
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body of cases with published opinions needs to be viewed with
greater sensitivity to the ways in which such cases are unrepre-
sentative of all cases. Rather than ignoring the issue of representa-
tiveness or relegating it to a footnote, we want to urge scholars
and/or consumers of research to think more carefully about the
kinds of biases introduced by concentrating on published opinions.
If we know that there are systematic divergences between cases
with published opinions and those without, we can interpret re-
sults accordingly.1 0 Our aim is to provide a sense of these differ-
ences.
II. ESTIMATES OF THE PUBLICATION RATE FOR
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
This section compares the number of employment discrimina-
tion cases with and without published opinions. If most cases gen-
erated published opinions, the ability of published cases accurately
to represent all cases would be of relatively little importance. To
summarize our conclusion, however, roughly 80 percent of the
4,310 cases in the population we studied did not produce a pub-
lished district court opinion."1
Before we can say anything about the publication rate for em-
ployment discrimination cases, however, we need to explain the
nature of our data.
A. The Population of Employment Discrimination Cases
Every case filed in federal courts is classified into one of
eighty-five "Nature of Suit" categories established by the Adminis-
trative Office of the US Courts (AO). 12 "Civil Rights, Employ-
ment" (Code 442) contains cases brought under Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act,' 3 as well as under sections 1981 and 1983
(the Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Acts), the Equal Pay Act, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment
multiplied by a factor of more than three to be expressed in current dollars.
We discuss the costs and benefits of using published opinions in the conclusion.
10 Econometricians have developed sophisticated techniques to deal with
what has become known as the sample selection bias problem. The pioneering
reference is Heckman (1979). Greene (1990b: 262) describes the sample selec-
tion correction this way: "The general solution to the selectivity problem relies
upon an auxiliary model of the process generating [the sample]. Information
about this process is incorporated in the estimation of [the variables of inter-
est]." However, alternative techniques-including nonrigorous means of com-
pensating for selection bias-may be just as effective (Stolzenberg and Relles,
1990: 408).
11 As explained in the Appendix, we started with the complete listing of
federal employment discrimination cases for the Northern District of Illinois
between 1 July 1972 and 31 March 1987.
12 The civil cover sheet in which this and other information is coded is
filled out by the plaintiff's attorney and checked by a clerk.
13 Title VII is the basic federal statute prohibiting discrimination in em-
ployment on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin.
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Act; the category also contains some suits by government employ-
ees alleging violation of their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to due process (typically, through discharge without proper
civil service procedures). 1 4 In the Northern District of Illinois,
there were 4,310 unique Employment Civil Rights cases filed be-
tween I July 1972 and 31 December 1986.15 Further details about
the Administrative Office data may be found in the Appendix.
B. The Population of Employment Discrimination Cases with
Published Opinions
"Employment discrimination cases with published district
court opinions" is a less precise concept than "Employment dis-
crimination cases" per se, because the words "published opinions"
are subject to multiple interpretations. 16 We take "published opin-
ion" to mean "included in LEXIS," rather than restricting the defi-
nition to those cases published in a reporter such West's Federal
Supplement or BNA's Fair Employment Practice Cases Digest.
17
There are two justifications for this decision. First, since social sci-
ence researchers are now taking advantage of the ability to search
computer libraries such as LEXIS and WESTLAW to elicit data about
litigation, it is interesting to explore how accurate these uses are,
given the selective nature of publication. Second, to the extent that
we use a more expansive definition, we adopt an approach that is
least favorable to our hypothesis. The broader the definition of
14 Although the statute under which the case is brought was not listed on
the AO tape before 1989, the ABF's survey-based on a sample of 1,200 cases
from the tape--demonstrates that most (more than 80 percent) of the cases
raise a Title VII claim, either alone or in conjunction with one or more of the
other statutes. For further details about the AO's coding procedures, see Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts, Statistical Analysis and Re-
ports Division (June 1989).
15 As discussed in note 6, we obtained from the AO a tape containing the
information for all of the "Civil Rights, Employment" cases filed between 1
July 1972 and 31 March 1987. This tape was used to generate the information
about "all employment discrimination cases" that forms the baseline for our
study.
Each case is supposed to be identified by a unique docket number, whose
first two digits designate the year in which the case was filed, but we found
that about 3 percent of all docket numbers were duplicates. On inspection,
most of these cases had identical or virtually identical plaintiff and defendant
names (e.g., "Schmoo v. Weinberger" and "Schmoo v. Sec'y of Defense") and
filing dates. We therefore deleted the second occurrence of all duplicate docket
numbers.
16 Brenner (1989) citing Reynolds and Richman (1978: 1169-71):
In the 1970's the federal circuits adopted rules which distinguish be-
tween "published" opinions, which are "precedent," and "unpub-
lished" opinions, which are not "precedent." These rules equate "pub-
lication" with appearing in print in a West reporter.... An opinion is
"published" when its full text appears in that reporter and "unpub-
lished" when only a notation of the disposition of the case appears.
17 LEXIS now includes all cases published in hard copy by BNA's Fair
Employment Practice Cases, dating back through the start of the digest in July
1965. Conversation with Michelle Love, Mead Data Central, 27 April 1990.
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"published cases," the more such cases we will find and the higher
the ratio of published cases to unpublished. Other things equal,
published cases are more likely to be representative of unpub-
lished cases if the ratio of published to unpublished is 1:2 than if it
is 1:10.
The technique we used to determine the set of cases with pub-
lished opinions involved matching the docket numbers of the cases
found in an extremely broad LEXIS search with those listed on the
Administrative Office tape. Interested readers will find a fuller de-
scription in the Appendix.
C Defining the Publication Rate
Conceptually, the definition of the publication rate is fairly
clear-it is simply the ratio of the number of published cases to
the number of cases that are eligible for publication. In practice,
however, defining the publication rate is not completely straight-
forward, with most of the difficulty stemming from the measure-
ment of the denominator in the publication rate calculation.' s
We chose to take the broadest possible definition of "cases eli-
gible for publication," assuming that any filed case is at least po-
tentially capable of generating a published opinion. One might in-
stead choose to limit the denominator-for example, to cases that
required some judicial action. Such a limitation might be appropri-
ate for research about the legal system-in computing judges'
workloads, for example. But our goal was to get as far down the
pyramid of disputes as possible. Cases that required judicial action
are likely to be subject to the same kinds of sample selection
problems as published cases. To determine whether published
cases yield an accurate picture of the lowest level of the pyramid,
the appropriate comparison is therefore between published cases
and all filed cases.
D. A Comparison of the Two Populations
We begin with two populations of cases: the first is the list of
the 4,310 employment discrimination cases in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois filed over a fifteen-year period, and the second is a
list of cases generated by LEXIS for the same district and time pe-
riod using the very expansive search (described in the Appendix)
to capture all employment discrimination cases that have gener-
ated published opinions. For the period as a whole, the volume of
LEXIS cases averaged 71 percent of the volume of AO cases
(although with considerable year-to-year variation). 19
In fact, however, our expansive LEXIS search captured many
18 There may be some complications arising from our definition of "pub-
lished cases," as well, as noted earlier.
19 That is, we found 3,058 unique cases in our LEXIS search, and 4,310
unique cases on the AO tape, for a ratio of 0.709.
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nonemployment discrimination cases, so that the true percentage
of AO cases that turned up on LEXIS was far smaller than 71 per-
cent. Figure 1 plots the number of cases on the AO tape that were
also found in the LEXIS search as a percentage of all cases on the
AO tape. The figure makes it clear that most of the LEXIS cases are
not the same as those listed on the AO tape. This should not be
surprising: given the deliberately broad search technique used, we
were certain to pick up a large number of cases that were not
about employment discrimination.20
The percentage of AO cases that can be matched with a LEXIS
case clearly has been rising over time: only 6 percent of the em-
ployment discrimination cases that were filed in 1974 generated an
opinion that subsequently appeared on LEXIS, while by 1986 this
percentage had risen to 27 percent. The reason for this strong up-
ward trend is unclear.21 One possibility is that the trend arises
from a behavioral change on the part of LExIS: the company might
now include cases that previously it ignored. The competition be-
tween WESTLAW and LEXIS to be the most comprehensive computer
library of legal material might explain such a trend, although
LEXIS officials contend that there has been no such change in pol-
icy. Another possibility is that the trend is caused by judges writ-
ing opinions in cases that they would not have written on in the
past, or submitting for publication opinions that an earlier genera-
tion of judges would have consigned to the files.22 We suspect that
20 For example, any opinion referring to price discrimination or citing
Title VII of the Bankruptcy Code would be detected by our search. So would
an opinion in which the judge wrote "Unlike Title VII, the Fair Housing Act
provides for .... ." Of course, many cases brought under §§ 1981 and 1983 do
not concern discrimination in employment at all. It is especially likely that
many of the 1404 additional citations found under § 1983 (i.e., those that did
not mention Title VII) fell into this category (see Appendix Table Al).
21 Indeed, the estimated trend is actually biased downward, although the
extent is probably minor. The bias results from the fact that not all cases filed
by 1986 had been terminated by the time of our LEXIS search in 1989, and
therefore some cases that will later produce a published opinion are not yet
included. Since the duration of the average case is slightly more than one year
(with a standard deviation of about 1.5 years), however, the bias should be
small.
22 The official federal reporters of district court decisions, which appear
on LEXIS, have been termed the vanity press of the federal judiciary, since
any opinion that a federal judge submits to West Publishing Company will be
published. As federal judges get younger, perhaps the average degree of vanity
is rising.
One other possibility is that increasing numbers of law clerks are now
able to write decisions that the judge would in the past have decided orally or
in a briefer and less noteworthy written opinion. This is unlikely to be a fac-
tor, however, because the number of law clerks per federal district court
judges has not changed since it rose to two in 1965 (Posner, 1985: 102). Nor is
expanding use of word processors likely to be the explanation since the trend
precedes the greater use of personal computing technology in the 1980s. Fi-
nally, we can reject the notion that the workload of district court judges has
been shrinking over time, enabling them to write more publishable opinions:
there were 365 filings per district court judge in 1972 and this number rose
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Figure 1. Matching docket numbers between tape from Administrative Office of
the United States Courts (AO Tape) and LEXIS search (described in
text) as a percentage of the number of cases on the AO tape, by year,
Northern District of Illinois, 1 July 1972 to 31 December 1986.
the primary reason is that federal law in general and employment
discrimination law in particular are becoming more complicated. 23
More central to our concerns in this article than the upward
trend in published opinions per filed cases is that the match rate
(publication rate) for the period as a whole averages only 20.1 per-
cent:24 only 867 of the 4,310 cases on the AO tape generated any
sort of published record as indexed by LEXIS. Excluding all cases
without published opinions thus eliminates 4 in 5 of all cases filed.
For some purposes, using published cases as a method of sample
selection may be innocuous; as we argue below, however, it will
often produce biased samples.
23 Because judges are less likely to write opinions that only address clear
or settled legal issues, complexity and changes in law should generate more
written decisions. The fact that the average length of federal circuit court
opinions and the number of footnotes and citations per opinion has been in-
creasing over time provides some evidence of the increasing complexity of the
opinions themselves (Posner, 1985: 358-60, Table B.4).
24 This is higher than the 12.2 percent (11 cases out of 90) publication rate
for civil rights cases of all kinds found by Olson (1989). There are at least four
possible explanations for this difference. First, Olson's data all come from the
federal district court for Minnesota, and publication rates seem to differ by
district. Second, her category includes civil rights cases of all kinds, while we
focus on employment civil rights cases. Third, her data come from a two-year
period (1982-84), and cover only a small number of cases (90 civil rights cases
of all kinds, of which 11 were published). Our sample covers 4,310 cases over
fifteen years. Fourth, the difference in publication rates across the two studies
might merely reflect random sampling differences. Indeed, the x2 test (1 d.f.)
reveals no signficant difference in the two proportions (X2= 3 .44, p > 0.05).
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E. Comparing Publication Rates Across Districts
1. Methodology. To provide some perspective on the finding
that 20 percent of the employment discrimination cases filed in the
Northern District of Illinois over a fifteen-year period generated a
published district court opinion, we found it useful to compare this
figure with publication rates in other districts, both for employ-
ment discrimination and other civil cases. The comparison was fa-
cilitated by the fact that we had already generated random sam-
ples of roughly 150 cases in each of seven districts using the AO
tape of all "employment civil rights" cases.
25
To obtain publication rate estimates, we first determined
which cases were not about employment discrimination,26 and
eliminated them from consideration. We then searched on LEXIS
(by docket number) for each of the remaining employment dis-
crimination cases.27 The-publication rate was computed by dividing
the number of cases with published opinions by the total number
of employment discrimination cases in our sample (col. (3) of Ta-
ble 1).
Column (4) of Table 1 also gives the "pseudo-publication rate,"
defined as the total number of opinions found divided by the total
number of docket numbers searched for. Because multiple opin-
ions were not eliminated, these estimates are not comparable with
those derived earlier from the Northern District of Illinois or with
the estimated publication rates presented in column (3). Neverthe-
less, the calculation of the "pseudo publication rate" for the em-
ployment discrimination cases is useful because it provides a
method of comparing the relative likelihood that employment dis-
crimination and nonemployment discrimination cases will generate
published opinions. Because it is impossible to eliminate multiple
opinions in estimating the publication rate for all civil cases, we
were forced to use the "pseudo publication rates" in making this
comparison.
To estimate the pseudo-publication rate for all civil cases, we
first conducted a LEXIS search for all civil docket numbers by dis-
trict.28 For each of the seven districts, we then took the total
25 The seven districts were chosen because we had already coded data
from random samples of employment civil rights cases from these districts as
part of the ABF study referred to earlier.
26 That is, we deleted those cases in which the complaint did not allege a
cause of action based on the plaintiffs age, sex, race, handicap status, religion,
national origin, or pregnancy. The cases eliminated were virtually all due pro-
cess claims brought by government employees (plus a smattering of miscoded
cases that were not about employment civil rights at all).
27 The format for docket numbers varies across districts and, in some dis-
tricts, also changes over time. We took care to include all possible variants of
docket number formats in our searches.
28 Searching LEXIS for all civil cases is not straightforward. Our basic
procedure was to use a search request such as
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number of opinions found in our LEXIS search and divided by the
total number of closed civil cases in fiscal years 1973 through 1987
(obtained from the Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts) to obtain an estimate of the pseudo-publication
rate.
2. Results. Table 1 presents the results of these searches.
Three strong conclusions emerge. First, publication rates for em-
ployment discrimination cases vary dramatically across districts. In
the three northern, urban districts with large caseloads (New
York, Chicago, and Philadelphia) more than one-fifth of all em-
ployment discrimination cases filed generate a published opinion.
In the four other districts (three in the South, plus San Francisco),
only about one in twenty employment discrimination cases yields a
published opinion. Somewhat surprisingly, the higher publication
rates are found in the three districts with the largest caseloads.
Second, the overall publication rate for employment discrimina-
tion cases is quite low-less than 15 percent. Finally, the correla-
tions among all the publication rate estimates are extremely high:
districts that publish a relatively high proportion of their employ-
ment discrimination cases also seem to publish an unusually large
share of all civil cases.29
These results suggest that relying solely on cases with pub-
lished opinions will generally produce a geographically skewed
sample of all cases filed in the United States. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that one had a list of all the closed civil cases from each of the
seven judicial districts listed in Table 1. The probability that a ran-
domly selected closed case would come from the Southern District
of New York is only 22.4 percent, while the probability that a ran-
domly selected published opinion would come from the same dis-
trict is 38.5 percent, with the difference being attributable to New
York's higher-than-average publication rate.
In sum, differences in publication rates by judicial district ap-
pear to be substantial, and to be highly correlated across employ-
ment discrimination cases and all civil cases. These differences
may pose problems for researchers who use published opinions, as
suggested below.
and Illinois) and date aft 6/30/72 and date bef 7/1/87 and number (C!)
and not number ( CR!)
This was designed to capture civil docket numbers such as "74 Civ 192" and
"74 C 1972," while excluding criminal docket numbers such as "74 CRIM 189"
or "74 CR 189." Again, docket number formats varied substantially across dis-
tricts, and sometimes within districts over time as well, so that modifications
of this strategy had to be used. More precise details are available on request
from the authors.
29 This is also true of the pseudo-publication rate estimates.
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III. WHY CASES WITH PUBLISHED OPINIONS MIGHT BE
DIFFERENT FROM THOSE WITHOUT
A. A Definition of "Unrepresentative Sample"
We all have a common-sense understanding of what it means
to say that one group is unrepresentative of a larger group. This
section presents an extremely simple formal definition of un-
representativeness, based on the concept of statistical indepen-
dence, which will be useful in analyzing the problems we discuss
below.
Intuitively, a sample will be biased with respect to some varia-
ble X if that variable is independently distributed with respect to
the variable Z that is used to select the sample. For example, if the
sample selection variable Z is whether or not the case is published,
then the value of any variable X that is correlated with Z will be
biased as measured in the sample.30
Note that this definition raises the important possibility that
the sample is unbiased for some variables but not for others. For
example, suppose that cases with published opinions, on average,
last longer than those without. Sampling only those cases with
published opinions will bias the researcher's estimate of a case's
duration, since the expected duration of cases in the sample will be
longer than the average duration of the cases in the entire popula-
tion. Suppose, however, that the variable of interest is not the du-
ration of the case but the plaintiff's gender. If the gender of the
plaintiff is independent of whether a case generates a written opin-
ion, then selecting only those cases with published opinions will
not influence any estimate of the proportion of plaintiffs who are
women. This discussion demonstrates that, above all, the sample
selection problem requires the researcher to have a clear concep-
tion of the process that generates the sample being used, and
which, if any, of the variables of interest are likely to be related to
this process.
B. The Process That Generates an Opinion
Using the existence of a published case as our selection (Z) va-
riable, we can see that selection (publication) is unlikely to be in-
dependent of many of the variables in which social scientists are
interested. To understand how the subset of cases with published
opinions is likely to differ from the set of all cases, therefore, we
need to analyze the process that generates a published opinion. Ol-
son (1989: 3) provides a convenient summary of this process:
30 Formally, we would say that bias exists whenever the expected value
of X conditional on Z is not equal to its unconditional expectation, or
E(XIZ)=E(X).
In another context (Good, 1968: 296), "as Sir Arthur Eddington once
pointed out, if you catch fish with a net having a 6-inch mesh, you are liable to
formulate the hypothesis that all fish are more than 6 inches in length."
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Table 2. A Hypothetical Depiction of the Process Generating a Published Opinion
in an Employment Discrimination Case
% of All Cases Filed % of
Stage of Process That Reach This Stage Previous Stage
1. Initial number of cases filed (settled, 100
dropped, etc., without producing (60-40)
an opinion)
2. Adjudicated (Kritzer's broad 40-60 40-60
definition)
3. Judge writes decision 35 58-88
4. Judge submits decision for 12-22 34-63
publication
5. LEXIS publishes decisiona 11.75-21.5 98
a Mead Data Central claims that it publishes everything it receives. Phone con-
versation with Michelle Love, 27 April 1990.
Four steps occur from the termination of a case to its being
reported in one of the national . . . computerized sources.
First, the case must be disposed of by a judicial decision.
Second, the judge must write an opinion rather than
merely issuing the decision orally. Third, . . . Mead Data
Central [the company that runs LEXIs] must acquire the
published opinion. Fourth, ... [it] must decide to report
the opinion.
We should offer one correction to this categorization. A case
may well generate a published legal decision on a preliminary mat-
ter that is not dispostive. For example, a motion for class certifica-
tion is often an important question in employment discrimination
matters, and a case will often settle in the wake of the judge's rul-
ing on this motion. But if significant issues of law and/or fact are
raised, the judge might well make her decision in this preliminary
matter in writing, and this decision could then be published. None-
theless, it is almost certainly the case that rulings that dispose of a
case are more likely to be written and more likely to be published.
As long as this condition is true, then settlement (or the dropping
of the case by the plaintiff) will tend to reduce the likelihood that
a case will generate a published legal decision. Since so many cases
are settled or dropped, this factor will have an important impact in
reducing the likelihood of a case appearing in LEXIS: the best avail-
able evidence seems to suggest that settlement of one sort or an-
other eliminates at least 40-60 percent of all filed cases.31 Table 2
provides more detail.
Borrowing from the language of demography, we can think of
the various possible case outcomes as different "causes of death"
31 Kritzer (1986: 165) found that judges made an adjudicatory decision in
roughly 43 percent of his sample of 809 federal civil cases of all kinds. The
comparable figure for civil rights cases was 57 percent, but this included both
state and federal cases, and was based on a small N of only 109; it is therefore
not strictly comparable. Moreover, Kritzer's definition of adjudication is a
rather broad one and probably includes situations in which judges are unlikely
to produce a written opinion.
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for a case. If settlement "kills off" 40-60 percent of all cases filed,
and if 10-20 percent of all cases end in the publication of a pub-
lished opinion, all other causes (rows 3 and 4 in Table 2) combined
must account for only 20-50 percent of all "deaths. '3 2
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE SELECTION PROCESS
A. Settlement Fjfects
The key insight of section III.A is that sample selection bias in
the measurement of variable X will occur whenever the criterion
for inclusion in the sample and the variable X are not distributed
independent of each other. In other words, if anything that causes
a case to "die" without a published opinion is correlated with any
variable of interest to social scientists, that variable will be subject
to sample selection bias when the sample consists only of pub-
lished cases. This suggests that we should begin our analysis of se-
lection bias with the first (and most important) cause of "prema-
ture death"-settlement. 33
Settled cases are less likely to produce published opinions
than those that terminate with an adjudicated result for two rea-
sons. First, intermediate rulings (for example, on motions to dis-
miss, motions for summary judgment, and so on) are substantially
less likely to be published than are final adjudications, since judges
do not typically produce lengthy opinions on such issues, and are
less inclined to submit what they do write for publication. More-
over, many settled' cases settle before the judge has a chance to
produce any intermediate rulings.
As long as settled cases are less likely than adjudicated cases
to produce published opinions, any variable that influences the
probability of settlement will not be independent of the sample se-
32 One caution about applying these percentages to our sample should be
noted. Olson and Kritzer both used samples of terminated cases only; we use
all cases filed over a certain period, whether terminated or not. Given our pre-
vious claim that a judicial decision that terminates a case elevates the likeli-
hood that a published decision will emerge, the proportion of cases in our sam-
ple that generates published decisions will be biased downward, although as
argued earlier, this bias should be small given that the sample period ended
more than two years before the LEXIS search was carried out.
In theory, one could correct for this problem by computing hazard rates
showing the likelihood that cases in our sample will generate a published deci-
sion in the next time period. The benefit from estimating hazard functions is
that a researcher can simply use the information from any case to indicate
whether the event in question-the publication of a decision--occurred before
the case ended or the period of observation came to a close.
33 Employment discrimination cases are, of course, "disputes" before they
are filed cases, and as such they are subject to prior screening by the EEOC, to
negotiation by the parties before any complaint is filed, and so on and on. The
utility of looking at cases with written opinions, or legal cases at all, depends
of course on how far down the pyramid of disputes one wishes to look. For
some limited evidence that EEOC screening serves as an essentially neutral
filter that does not dramatically alter the composition of cases, see Donohue
and Siegelman (1991).
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lection criterion. The key question then becomes, what determines
whether a case settles or not? One can draw upon the Priest/Klein
model of the selection of disputes for litigation in order to derive
theoretical predictions of how cases generating published opinions
might differ systematically from cases that yield no published deci-
sion. For example, in other work we have shown that the overall
win rate at trial for plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases
(including some of those with published opinions and some with-
out) is quite low, perhaps as low as 20 percent, and certainly less
than 50 percent. The Priest/Klein model predicts that this pattern
will be observed when the defendant's stakes in the litigation are
greater than the plaintiff's, which might well be true in certain
employment discrimination contexts. For example, a defendant
might well believe that a finding that he unlawfully refused to
hire blacks would subject his firm to a possible loss that was far
greater-either from bad will in the community or from demands
from other rejected black applicants claiming similar discrimina-
tion-than what the plaintiff would gain from trial. Thus, the de-
fendant would be more willing to settle out cases that might im-
pose this loss than he would if the stakes between the plaintiff and
defendant were equal.
Suppose that our sample were evenly divided into fifty cases
of discrimination against black job applicants, in which the stakes
were higher for the defendant than for the plaintiff, and fifty cases
of refusal to grant paid leave to Jewish workers on Yom Kippur,
in which the stakes were even. We might expect ceteris paribus
that the settlement rate would be higher in the first category. Now
since we have claimed that cases that end in settlement are less
likely to generate published opinions, this fact combined with the
above differential settlement rate yields the following predictions
of systematic differences between cases with and without pub-
lished decisions: (1) published decisions will be more prevalent
among the cases in which the stakes between the parties are equal;
and (2) readers of published opinions will think that cases of dis-
criminatory refusal to hire blacks are less common than they in
fact are, both absolutely and relative to other types of discrimina-
tion cases.
A substantial literature also indicates that uncertainty about
the likely outcome of a trial will diminish the chance that the case
will be settled. The reason is that if both parties know what will
happen, they are better off settling for this amount and pocketing
the litigation costs they have avoided. But if settled cases will tend
to be those with lower uncertainty (other things being equal), then
more uncertain cases will tend to settle less and therefore will
have higher rates of published opinions. Consequently, more com-
plicated disparate impact cases (or perhaps age discrimination
cases) should be more numerous among those with written opin-
ions than among those without.
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B. Other Effects Based on Judicial Behavior
The other three stages in the production of a published opin-
ion (described above in Table 2) seem to be less useful in terms of
providing predictions of systematic differences between cases with
and without published decisions. For example, lacking a good the-
ory about what makes a judge decide to write or submit an opin-
ion, we are not well equipped to explain what sorts of biases are
introduced by these decisions.
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suppose that other things
being equal, judges will be more likely to write and submit an
opinion in a case the more "important" that case is.34 "Important"
is obviously a highly subjective word.3 5 One measure of importance
might be the size of the stakes involved-larger monetary de-
mands or complex efforts to reshape hiring or promotion policy.
But considerations of legal importance are probably more relevant
than factual importance. That is, judges will be more likely to
write and submit an opinion if the case breaks novel legal ground
than if it merely presents a new (or interesting) fact situation.36
One might think of district court decisions that break new
legal grounds as analogous to genetic mutations. There are more
than five hundered federal district court judges, and when one of
them breaks new ground it likely means that he or she is doing
something differently than others have done. As with genetic mu-
tations, some of which are highly favorable to the survival of the
species but most of which are not, the preponderance of highly un-
orthodox district court decisions-Judge W. Brevard Hand's ruling
that secular humanism is a religion that cannot be presented in
the public schools3 7 comes to mind---are aberrant and soon to be
34 Olson's data, however, seem to refute this hypothesis. She finds that
when lawyers are interviewed after the conclusion of a case, their assessment
of whether the case raises broader legal issues (a measure of its importance)
bears no relationship to the probability of publication (Olson; 1989: 9-10). She
also cites political science research suggesting that "judges' egos and years of
experience on the bench influence how many of their opinions they consider
important enough for publication" (ibid., p. 5, citing Carp and Rowland, 1983).
Although such variables as age, experience, and self-esteem may influence the
probability that a given judge produces a published opinion in a given case,
since cases are assigned randomly to judges, such effects presumably wash out
in larger samples and thus can be ignored. However, a reviewer pointed out to
us that a major statute creating new judges "could certainly make the effects
[of age and experience] non-random . . . for a study comparing publication
rates over time."
35 Eisenberg and Schwab (1989: 508) cite two studies by Franklin (1981:
799 n. 11; 1980: 464) demonstrating that "trial judges are more likely to publish
opinions when making decisions that conclude cases, such as granting motions
to dismiss or granting summary judgment, .. than when denying such mo-
tions."
36 Eisenberg and Schwab (1989: 535) write: "Judges themselves decide
whether to publish an opinion. The general criterion for publication is that the
case be noteworthy rather than routine or obvious, and thus will contribute to
the development of the law."
37 Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County (1987).
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reversed on appeal. Thus, one might expect to find (1) more unu-
sual district court decisions among reported decisions and (2)
higher rates of reversal for appeals from published decisions than
for appeals from among nonpublished decisions.38
V. AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF PUBLISHED OPINION
BIAS
The analysis of the previous section suggested several ways in
which cases with published opinions are likely to differ from those
without them. This section attempts to test these hypotheses by
comparing a random sample of published employment discrimina-
tion cases from the Northern District of Illinois39 with a random
sample of such cases that did not produce published decisions.
40
Once we had selected our two samples, we collected data from the
original district court case files at the Federal Records Center in
Chicago.41
Tables 3-7 present some simple comparisons of the two sam-
ples. As we predicted above, the cases with published decisions
tend to be more complex as evidenced by a number of different
factors. First, the file is more than two and one-half times as thick
in published cases as in nonpublished cases. Second, the average
number of plaintiffs is considerably higher in the published cases,
and the proportion of cases that were certified as class actions in
published cases (13.1 percent) is more than six times the propor-
tion in unpublished cases (1.9 percent). Third, in two-thirds of the
cases from the published sample, violations were alleged to be con-
tinuous-for example, harassment occurring over a period of time,
as opposed to a single refusal to hire-while only half the cases
38 A reviewer pointed out to us that this proposition has been tested.
Songer (1988: 211) compares reversal rates for cases not listed in the Federal
Supplement and those that were listed (published, in his definition). He finds
both surprisingly high reversal rates in unpublished opinions and only slightly
higher reversal rates in published opinions.
39 As discussed in sec. II.B, there were 867 cases (unique docket numbers)
that were (1) listed on LEXIS and (2) matched one of the 4,310 docket num-
bers on the AO tape. We randomly selected 114 cases from this population of
867.
40 To obtain this sample, we began by selecting 179 cases at random from
the population of all employment discrimination cases filed in the Northern
District of Illinois over the period 1972-87. (See Appendix for further detail.)
We then searched on LEXIS for these 179 docket numbers and removed the 39
cases with published opinions. We were thus left with a sample of 140 cases.
We also removed all cases that were not about employment discrimination per
se, leaving a total of 105 employment discrimination cases without published
opinions.
Note that this procedure also serves as a check on the estimate of the pub-
lication rate produced earlier. It yields an estimated publication rate of 39/
179=21.8 percent. This is not statistically significantly different from the 20.1
percent publication rate estimated above on the entire sample of 4,310 cases
(X2 (1 d.f.)=0.49, p>0.05).
41 Copies of the code sheet, coding instructions, and the raw data used in
the following analysis are available by request from the authors.
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Table 3. Samples of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination
Cases, Northern District of Illinois, 1972-86 (Standard Deviations in
Parentheses)
A. Continuously Measurable Characteristics of Cases
Average in Average in
Unpublished Published Z-
Variable Cases N Cases N valuea
File size (in inches) 2.0 97 5.2 114 2.78
(4.0) (11.5) [0.01]
Total dollars awardedb $12,545 18 $606,424 19 1.53
($12,979) ($1,687,853) [0.12]
Dollars/plaintiff $12,375 18 $47,907 15 2.79
($13,088) ($47,867) [0.01]
Fees awarded $6,400 2 $29,765 9 1.88
($6,505) ($34,700) [0.06]
Lag between violation and filing, 6.24 94 4.77 105 1.61
in quartersc  (6.07) (6.85) [0.10]
Average no. of plaintiffs 1.5 99 18.2 103 1.24
(3.1) (136.2) [0.21]
Plaintiff's job tenure (in years) 8.4 14 7.8 99 0.32
(5.9) (9.8) [0.74]
Plaintiff's age 48.3 6 49.1 45 0.17
(10.8) (10.8) [0.86]
Total cases in sample 105 114
a Z is the number of standard deviations from the mean of an N(0,1) variable.
The number in brackets is the significance level for a two-tailed test. The normal
rather than the T test is used because we do not assume equal variances in the two
samples. See, e.g., Hogg and Tanis (1977: 252).
b Includes fees, costs, and damages; excludes cases in which plaintiffs had to pay
defendants' fees or costs.
' The median lag was 4.5 quarters in the unpublished cases and 3.0 quarters in
the published cases.




(%) N (%) N X2(1) Level
Cases in which:
There was more than 1 plaintiff
At least 1 plaintiff was black
A class action was certified
Violation was continuousd





72.1 104 74.7 111 0.19 0.66
1.9 105 20.1 114 17.9
SOURCE: ABF survey of case files.
d A continuous violation occurs over some interval of time (e.g., harassment), as
opposed to a discrete, one-point-in-time violation such as failure to hire or firing.
from the unpublished sample made this allegation. In general, the
volume of evidence that is required to demonstrate a continuous
violation will be greater, thus contributing to the legal and factual
complexity of the case. Fourth, Table 6 reveals that plaintiffs in
cases that generated published opinions seek more forms of relief
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Table 4. Basis of Suit, Basis of Discrimination, and Type of Discrimination in
Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases
% of % of
Cases Without Cases With
Published Published Significance
Opinion Opinion X2(1) Level
A. Cases raising a claim under:
Title VII 84.8 78.1 1.61 0.20
Age Discrimination in 5.7 24.6 14.80 0.01
Employment Act
Equal Pay Act 6.7 0.9 5.21 0.02
§ 1981 32.4 27.2 0.77 0.40
§ 1983 14.3 10.5 0.71 0.40
Rehabilitation Act 1.0 1.8 0.26 0.62
Constitutional amendment 16.2 18.4 0.18 0.67
Pendant state claims 2.9 9.6 4.21 0.04
B. Cases in which basis of
discrimination included:
Age 6.7 25.4 14.02 0.01
Sex 34.3 31.6 0.18 0.67
Race 63.8 48.2 5.37 0.02
Handicap 2.9 6.1 1.35 0.26
Religion 1.0 2.6 0.86 0.38
National origin 9.5 12.3 0.43 0.51
Pregnancy 1.9 2.6 0.13 0.73
Other 1.0 0.0 1.09 0.28
C. Cases in which type of
discrimination included:
Hiring 13.3 17.5 0.74 0.39
Firing 75.2 62.3 4.25 0.02
Pay 25.7 19.3 1.30 0.26
Demotion/promotion 28.6 36.8 1.69 0.20
Seniority 5.7 6.1 0.02 0.89
Conditions of employment 36.2 38.6 0.14 0.62
Retaliation 11.4 20.2 3.11 0.08
Total no. of cases 105 114
SOURCE: A1F survey of case files.
NOTE: Because plaintiffs could sue under more than one statute or allege more
than one basis or type of discrimination, the percentages do not add to 100 percent
and the X2 tests are therefore line-by-line comparisons.
than plaintiffs in cases that do not result in published opinions:
note that in only one of the categories-punitive damages-is the
proportion in the first column greater than the proportion in the
second column, and even here there is no significant difference be-
tween the two.
The amount in controversy is similarly far greater for the pub-
lished cases than the unpublished cases. The best evidence of this
is the finding in Table 3 that the average number of dollars
awarded per plaintiff is almost four times as great in published
cases ($47,907) as in unpublished cases ($12,375). 42 As one would
42 The figures for total dollars awarded in Table 3 show an even more
dramatic difference-$606,424 versus $12,545--but one that is less statistically
significant than the per plaintiff comparison. This apparent anomaly is ex-
plained by the unusually high award in one published case with numerous
plaintiffs, which caused the average award in the published cases to rise,
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Table 5. Plaintiffs' Occupations and Defendants' SIC Codes in Published and
Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases
Cases Without Cases With
Published Published
Opinion Opinion
No. of plaintiffs whose occupation was:
Managerial and professional 17 31
Technical, sales, and other support 17 30
Service 16 15
Precision production 3 12
Operator, fabricator 26 18
Total 79 106
X2 (4) = 10.86
Significance level = 0.03
No. of defendants whose SIC was:
Mining 1 0
Construction 3 2
Manufacturing durables 13 14
Manufacturing nondurables 10 15
Transportation 11 12
Utilities and communication 3 8
Wholesale/retail trade 10 9




X2 (9) = 9.09
Significance level = 0.43
SOURCE: ABF survey of case files.
expect given the higher damage awards, fees awarded to prevailing
plaintiffs were higher in the published cases, although not com-
mensurately higher as evidenced by the fact that the ratio of
award per plaintiff/fee award was 1.9 for unpublished opinions but
only 1.6 for published opinions. Perhaps related to the issue of big-
ger stakes is the finding that cases that will ultimately generate a
published opinion get to court significantly faster than those that
do not generate a published opinion: indeed, only 44.8 percent of
all unpublished cases were filed within one year of the violation,
while 60.1 percent of all published cases were. This is consistent
with the notion that there is more to gain from litigation in pub-
lished cases. Since pre-judgment interest is unlikely to be avail-
able, the cost of delay in filing is greater for higher stakes cases.
Table 4 demonstrates once again that complexity correlates
with whether the case generates a published opinion. For example,
far more published cases have pendant state claims attached to
their federal charges, and the relatively complex, novel, and evolv-
ing Age Discrimination in Employment Act is dramatically over-
represented in published cases. At the other extreme, the old,
thereby greatly increasing the standard error of the variable. Since the award
was not unusually high when computed on a per plaintiff basis, the standard
error for the dollars per plaintiff variable is far smaller in relation to the mean
dollars per plaintiff.
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Table 6. Cases in Which Plaintiffs Made Various Demands in Published and
Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases
% of % of
Cases Without Cases With
Published Published Significance
Opinion Opinion X2 (1) Level
Cases in which plaintiff asked for:
Reinstatement, hiring, or 54.1 69.8 6.01 0.01
promotion
Back pay 72.4 89.6 9.92 0.01
Injunction 58.2 59.4 0.03 0.87
Punitive damages 59.2 55.7 0.26 0.61
Declaratory judgment 29.6 31.1 0.05 0.82
Change employment practicesa 8.2 22.6 7.99 0.01
Pension or other benefits 16.3 35.8 9.96 0.01
Front pay 0.0 7.5 7.65 0.01
Clear record 0.0 1.9 1.88 0.17
Liquidated damages 1.0 14.2 12.25 0.01
Training 0.0 1.9 0.29 0.59
Other 5.1 16.0 6.30 0.01
No. of cases 98 106
SOURCE: ABF survey of case files.
NOTE: Because plaintiffs could make more than one kind of demand, the per-
centages do not add to 100 percent, and the X2 tests are therefore line-by-line com-
parisons.
a Includes affirmative action plan, recruitment, change seniority system, etc.
somewhat outdated (because it has largely been superseded by Ti-
tle VII), and static Equal Pay Act almost never appears in pub-
lished cases but is actually more common than Age Discrimination
Act cases in the unpublished cases. Moreover, as we suggested
above, firing cases-in which the stakes would seem to be roughly
symmetric for plaintiffs and defendants-appear significantly less
often in the published sample while hiring cases are over-
represented in the published sample.
Table 5 reveals that plaintiffs' occupations (but not defend-
ants' industrial classifications, at an aggregate level) are signifi-
cantly different in the two samples. As one would expect, manage-
rial, professional, and technical workers-which are the high-wage
job classifications-are more common in the published sample,
while low-wage operatives are overrepresented in the unpublished
sample. Similarly, if one looked only at published cases, one would
suspect that cases against utilities and government employers were
more common and cases brought in the service sector were less
frequent than they in fact are. The differences might be explained
by a wage effect, in that service jobs pay less and utility and (fed-
eral) government jobs pay more.
If the degree of complexity and novelty tends to be greater in
published cases than in unpublished cases, one would expect this
factor to have an effect on the rate of settlement. Specifically,
complexity and novelty increase the uncertainty of the case out-
come and therefore decrease the likelihood of settlement (see, e.g.,
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Table 7. Outcomes in Employment Discrimination Cases With and Without
Published Opinions
No. of Cases
No. of Cases Without With
Outcome Published Opinion Published Opinion
Settleda 70 39
Plaintiff won at trial 1 9
Defendant won 29 61
Dismissed, procedural reasons 1 5
Plaintiff dropped caseb 11 4
Dismissed, summary judgment for
defendant 7 22
Dismissed other motion 6 6
Dismissed, failure to state a claim 1 7
Tried, judgment for defendant 3 17
Other 3 3
Total no. of cases 103 112
Plaintiff Win Rate" 0.033 0.129
X2(1) = 2.12
Significance level = 0.15
SOURCE: ABF survey of case files.
a May include some cases that were simply dropped by plaintiff.
b Includes cases dismissed for want of prosecution.
c The win rate is defined as WINRATE = # of Cases won by Plaintiff/# of
Cases won by either Party.
Priest and Klein, 1984). Accordingly, we should expect to see
fewer settlements in the sample of cases with published opinions.
Table 7 confirms this prediction. The level of settlement is far
higher in cases without published opinions--68 percent, versus 35
percent in published cases. Another interesting finding is that
more than 10 percent of unpublished cases are simply dropped (or
dismissed for want of prosecution) by plaintiffs. Not surprisingly, a
far lower percentage of cases producing published opinions fall
into this category. At the same time that uncertainty tends to de-
crease the likelihood of settlement, it also probably tends to bias
the likelihood of victory toward 50 percent. The reason for this ef-
fect is that as the outcome of the litigation becomes more uncer-
tain, the event becomes closer to a coin flip in terms of the proba-
bilistic outcomes. Therefore, one would imagine that the win rates
would be closer to 50 percent in the more uncertain, published
cases, and the data supports this supposition. Looking only at cases
that are tried and reach a final adjudication, we see that the rate
of victory for plaintiffs in unpublished cases is 25 percent (1 of 4)
while the rate of victory in published cases is almost 35 percent (9
of 26). 4 3 In general, though, it is evident that win rates in employ-
ment discrimination cases are significantly below 50 percent. Ac-
cording to the Priest/Klein model this probably suggests that the
stakes are higher for defendants than for plaintiffs. Again, this
43 Of all nonsettled cases, plaintiffs appear to have won only 1 of 33 (3.3
percent) among those without published opinions, whereas they won 9 out of
73 (12.3 percent) of those with published opinions.
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seems plausible as an adverse judgment in an employment dis-
crimination case might inflict greater monetary loss on the defend-
ant than the award received by the plaintiff.
Overall, the most important pattern that emerges from this
welter of numbers is a simple one: cases with published opinions
are indeed significantly different from those without them. The
published cases tend to be longer, more complicated, more heavily
concentrated on newer areas of the law. They also seem to include
a different mix of plaintiff occupations, to proceed at a different
pace through the legal system, and to end in different kinds of out-
comes. For some purposes, differences between published and un-
published cases may not matter. The next section argues that in
some instances, however, important conclusions turn out to be sen-
sitive to the sample definition that is used.
VI. HOW SOCIAL SCIENTISTS HAVE USED EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES WITH PUBLISHED
OPINIONS
Samples of employment discrimination cases with published
opinions have been analyzed for a number of purposes, using a va-
riety of techniques: content analysis, simple counts (to construct
variables used for other purposes), and analysis of legal rules and
outcomes. In this section, we briefly review some of these studies
and suggest ways in which their findings are affected by their sam-
ple selection criterion.
A. The Effect of Title VII Suits on Black Employment Levels
Jonathan Leonard (1984) has studied the effects of affirmative
action requirements and Title VII lawsuits on black and female
employment. He developed his Title VII variable by conducting a
LEXIS search for Title VII class actions.44 He then sorted the suits
by the defendant firm, and used the number of such suits per firm
as an independent variable in a regression analysis to explain
changes in black and female employment levels in each firm. On
the basis of cross-sectional regressions, he reports that the number
of Title VII class action lawsuits per corporation is significantly re-
44 Leonard did not describe his search request, making it difficult to de-
scribe exactly what he did. Moreover, our attempts to replicate his results
were unsuccessful. In part, this may be due to the inclusion in LEXIS of addi-
tional cases that were not covered when Leonard undertook his search. But
without an adequate description of his search request, it is difficult to interpret
his results.
This difficulty is amplified by the lack of internal consistency in describ-
ing his search. On p. 146, Leonard writes that "between 1965 and 1977 the fed-
eral district courts decided more than 1700 class action suits brought under Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Four pages later, he notes that
"between 1964 and 1981 [note that the period covers four additional years at
the end, and one fewer at the beginning] more than 5000 cases of litigation
under Title VII, many of which were private suits, were decided in the federal
district courts. More than 1700 of these cases were class action suits."
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lated to the rate of increase in the percentage of black workers
over the period from 1966 to 1978.
In one sense, most of the biases inherent in looking at LEXIS
cases would not be problematic for Leonard's research because he
might well want to focus on the very high stakes, complex, and
novel cases that tend to be overrepresented in published decisions.
On the other hand, our own experience in trying to find employ-
ment discrimination cases of any type raises some concerns about
the hope that LEXIS alone can pick out the right cases. Although
Leonard's use of LEXIS was an imaginative attempt to evaluate the
effect of Title VII litigation, the fact that he gives no mention to
the LEXIS search strategy he employed suggests that he may not
have been aware of how difficult it is to achieve accurate figures
by simply relying on a LEXIS search.
First of all, any attempt to capture all Title VII class action
lawsuits will undoubtedly be far too inclusive; yet, if the search is
too narrowly defined, many cases will be missed. For example,
many Title VII class action suits are brought by white women:
thus, a simple search for Title VII risks bringing in all sorts of
cases that are unlikely to be correlated with better black perform-
ance. (Similarly, a substantial portion of cases containing the
words "Title VII" are actually age discrimination cases brought
largely by white males.) Nor is it obvious that all class actions
(whether or not the request for class certification was certified)
should be treated identically, as Leonard appears to have done. Fi-
nally, it is not clear that cases charging discrimination in hiring
should be treated symmetrically with those alleging discriminatory
failure to promote or firing. The latter charges can only be
brought by current or former employees. Thus, they are likely to
be caused by the employer's hiring practices, rather than to be a
cause of such practices.4 5
To examine the possible problems inherent in Leonard's con-
struction of his Title VII class action lawsuits variable, we per-
formed a simple LEXIS search designed, as best we could, to ap-
proximate his original sample. 46 This search yielded 5,566 Title VII
opinions and 1,815 Title VII class action opinions. We then read
and coded all the class action opinions for the years 1966 through
1969 (inclusive) and 1972, and half the class actions in 1976 and
1981, for a total of 304 opinions. Our findings are summarized
briefly in Table 8.
45 In fact, the ability of current workers to contest promotions and dis-
charge provides employers with an incentive not to hire women and minorities
(Donohue and Siegelman, 1991). Whether this disincentive is strong enough to
outweigh the positive incentive provided by hiring suits is an open question.
46 The search request was:
Library = GENFED
File = DIST
Level 1: Text (Title VII) and date (aft 12/31/63 and bef 1/1/82)
Level 2: Text(class action)
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Table 8. "Title VII Class Action" Opinions Found in Attempt to Replicate
Leonard's Results
Total opinions founda 1,815
Opinions read 304
Less:
Class definition uncertain b  47
EQUALS 257
Less:
Not class actions 29
Not employment discrimination 26
Multiple opinions (same underlying case) 12
EQUALS 190 "Valid" Opinions, of which:
Class definition includes minoritiesc 130 Of which
Hiring claims only 25
Post-hiring claimsd only 63
Both hiring and post-hiring 42
Other, unclassifiable, etc. 10
SOURCE: LEXIS search described in text.
a The search request used was Library = GENFED, File = DIST,
Level 1: Text(Title VII) and date (aft 12/31/63 and bef 1/1/82)
Level 2: Text(class action).
b E.g., opinion deals with an award of attorney's fees and does not describe the
nature of the class certified.
c As long as the designation of the class seeking representation included blacks or
other racial minorities (even if it also included whites), we included the opinion.
Thus, class designations such as "all minority workers," "all black female job appli-
cants," or "all black males and all white females" were included. Class designations
such as "all job applicants" or "all female job-holders" were not included.
d Post-hiring claims are those dealing with promotion, pay, conditions of employ-
ment, and firing.
The conclusion that emerges from Table 8 is that the variable
Leonard appears to have constructed to measure Title VII litiga-
tion is extremely imprecise. Of the 257 opinions (nominally class
action Title VII cases) that we could classify, 26 percent were
either not class actions at all, were not about discrimination, or
were duplicates of other opinions. Of the remaining 190 opinions,
60 were not brought by a class that specifically included blacks or
other minorities. Finally, only 25 of the remaining opinions (19.2
percent) contained challenges to hiring practices alone, while 63
(48.4 percent) contained only challenges to post-hiring practices,
and might thus be expected to have a negative effect on the em-
ployment of black workers. In sum, the opinions used by Leonard
do not seem to be an accurate measure of the kind of litigation
that might be expected to increase black employment.
B C7zanging Regional Distribution of Litigation
Jerome Culp (1985) argues that the South was the traditional
focus of early antidiscrimination litigation, but that by the early
1970s, employment discrimination litigation had spread to the rest
of the country and, in so doing, changed its targets, methods, and
results. Culp used a LEXIS search4 7 to demonstrate that the re-
47 Culp's (1985: 899) search term was "Title VII or 42 pre/5 2000!"
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Figure 2. Two estimates of the share of employment discrimination cases filed in
southern states, 1972-87, based on Title VII cases with published opinions
and the AO Tape. "South" is defined to be the 11 states of the
Confederacy plus Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and
Oklahoma. Source: Culp (1985) and AO tape.
gional distribution of cases brought under Title VII has changed
over time. From Culp's data, which are plotted in Figure 2, this
story appears to be reasonable.
Suppose, however, that one takes a somewhat broader defini-
tion of employment discrimination and includes all cases filed,
whether or not they generated a published opinion (and including
non-Title VII cases as well). The top line in the figure (based on
the data from the AO tape) reveals a somewhat different story.
Many more of the employment discrimination cases that do not
generate a written opinion are filed in the South; and their share
of all employment discrimination cases has been dropping far
more slowly than has their share of cases with written opinions.
As demonstrated earlier, southern districts seem to have much
lower publication rates than the rest of the country (for both em-
ployment discrimination and all civil cases). Thus, relying on pub-
lished cases to measure the geographical distribution of all cases
seems likely systematically to underrepresent certain regions of
the country.
48
48 Unless publication rates have been increasing faster outside the South,
differences in publication rates by region do not explain Culp's finding that
the share of (published) Title VII cases in the South has been declining over
time. Note, however, that age discrimination cases are more likely to generate
published opinions than other employment discrimination cases and that most
of the growth in age cases seems to have come in areas outside the South. It is
thus possible that southern publication rates for employment discrimination
cases have not been growing as fast as those in the rest of the country.
Moreover, the same concerns that we expressed above with respect to the
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C. Content Analysis
In a series of articles, Paul Burstein has made extensive and
imaginative use of a dataset consisting of federal appellate cases
concerning discrimination. Burstein (1989: 662 n.2) acknowledges
that "[d]isputes about allegedly discriminatory employment prac-
tices which reach the appellate courts are obviously not a random
sample of such disputes, and little is known about how the many
initial complaints about employment practices are winnowed to
the few leading to appellate decisions." (See also Burstein, 1988;
Burstein and Monaghan, 1986.) He goes on to argue (1989: 662 n.2)
that he is not attempting to generalize from appellate decisions to
other kinds of cases. "The justification for analyzing appellate de-
cisions is not that they are a random sample of disputes, however;
rather it is that they constitute the universe of a type of dispute of
special importance-an importance based on their consequences
for [women and minorities] in the labor market."
Nonetheless, in several places Burstein does claim that one
can indeed learn about labor market discrimination and the dis-
putes it generates from looking at appellate decisions. 49 Consider
two of the conclusions in his 1989 article: (1) "women often act col-
lectively against discrimination, frequently bringing class actions
and getting organizations to act on their behalf" (ibid., p. 660), and
(2) "Women win more than half their cases, considerably more
than prior work on confrontations between 'haves' and 'have nots'
would lead us to expect" (ibid., p. 660).50
While our discussion has focused only on the differences be-
tween published and unpublished cases at the district court level,
the same theoretical considerations would seem to apply a fortiori
when looking at appellate decisions. Our theoretical analysis of
sample selection bias suggests that both conclusions (1) and (2) are
likely to be to some significant degree an artifact of the sample
(appellate cases) that Burstein used. In other words, cases in which
women act collectively and/or file class actions and/or get organi-
zations to act on their behalf are much more likely to be litigated
Leonard study apply to Culp's LEXIS search. Merely looking for "Title VII"
can generate references to other statutes-Title VII of another act-or cases
that are merely referring to Title VII but have nothing to do with discrimina-
tion. For example, a reference that the right to jury trial does not extend to
Title VII litigants may be a case discussing the Seventh Amendment rather
than employment discrimination.
49 See, e.g., Burstein (1989: 660-61). He does note (1989: 661) that a "disad-
vantage . . .to focussing on E[qual]E[mployment]O[pportunity] cases" is that
"they do not represent a random sample of discriminatory practices."
50 There is some ambiguity about the referent in both of these conclu-
sions. For example, "often" might be interpreted to refer only to those cases
that are appealed. But there is a dilemma here: either Burstein is referring
only to appellate cases (in which case, as we show below, his findings are
likely to be in large measure the result of sample selection bias), or he is ex-
trapolating to all cases, in which case he appears to be overstating the case.
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vigorously (and subsequently to be appealed) than are typical
cases.
In the ABF's sample of 1,106 employment discrimination cases
nationwide (including published and unpublished cases), 356 (32.2
percent) alleged sex discrimination.5 Of these, in only 58 (16.2)
was there more than a single plaintiff suing: thus, it seems mis-
leading to say that women "often" act collectively against discrimi-
nation.52 Although they shed some light on the way women have
chosen to attack sex discrimination in the work place, Burstein's
data are thus better understood instead as revealing something
about which cases are selected for appeal.
A similar criticism can be leveled at Burstein's second conclu-
sion. Overall, plaintiff win rates in district court employment dis-
crimination cases (both published and unpublished) seem to be
closer to 20 percent than to 50 percent (Siegelman, 1991; Eisen-
berg, 1989). Thus, Burstein's finding that plaintiffs appear to win
about half of the appealed sex discrimination cases suggests not
that women are unusually successful, but rather that something
like the Priest/Klein selection effect is probably at work. Appel-
late cases are likely to be those in which the win rate is systemati-
cally closer to 50 percent than in all cases. Indeed, the win rate
was nearly four times higher in our sample of published employ-
ment discrimination cases than in the unpublished cases in Table
7,53 and it seems reasonable that the sample selection problems
would be even stronger in appellate cases.
In a similar sort of analysis, Stidham, Carp and Rowland
(1983) make no mention of the possibility of sample selection bias
in their study of district court race and sex discrimination cases
with written opinions. Their conclusion that 53 percent of the
cases were "liberal" (i.e., favored women plaintiffs) (ibid., p. 209) is
subject to exactly the same criticism as Burstein's result discussed
earlier. We would expect women or minorities to do better in cases
with written opinions than in those without them, so this high win
rate suggests more about how the sample of cases was selected
51 Note that this figure includes some cases in which the basis of discrimi-
nation was both sex and some other characteristic, such as age or race.
52 Plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases requested class certification for
their suits in only 36 of the 320 cases (11.2 percent). In only 14 of these cases
(4.3 percent of all sex cases) was this request granted. Clearly, most sex dis-
crimination suits are individual rather than collective actions; conversely, it is
relatively unusual for women to oppose discrimination collectively. We are not
suggesting that all suits are equal in importance--one class action can have a
hundred times the impact of a single-plaintiff suit. But the claim we wish to
refute is not that women work collectively in the important suits (which will
tend to be true almost by definition of "important"). The conclusion that wo-
men often act collectively, however, seems to be true only for the limited and
unrepresentative sample on which it was based.
53 The difference was only statistically significant at the 0.15 level, given
the small sample.
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than about the political or social forces at work in shaping litiga-
tion.
Finally, Mills (1981) seems to have been largely inattentive to
the concerns that we have tried to articulate. She claims to have
"all sex discrimination suits filed in U.S. District Court in the Sec-
ond, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and District of Columbia circuit under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act from its passage in 1964 through
1975" (ibid., p. 199) apparently without realizing that she is really
only working with those cases that generated published opinions
in the BNA reporter.
D. The Effect of Performance Appraisal System Characteristics
on Outcomes
Feild and Holley (1982) set out to examine the relationship be-
tween an employer's personnel system (in particular, how the sys-
tem evaluates job performance for determining promotion, pay,
and retention) and the outcome of employment discrimination liti-
gation against that employer. Their hypothesis is that unsound
performance appraisal techniques (such as the absence of specific
written instructions for evaluating performance) will increase the
probability of a plaintiff victory in a discrimination suit. Using dis-
criminant analysis, they conclude that five characteristics of per-
formance appraisal system do have a significant influence on trial
outcomes in their sample of sixty-six employment discrimination
cases with written opinions. 54
The authors' interesting analysis is somewhat tarnished by
their complete failure to consider sample selection problems, how-
ever. In fact, as Hughes and Snyder (1989) demonstrate, the statis-
tical assumptions underlying such an analysis using published
cases will necessarily be violated if publication induces sample se-
lection bias. One possible response might be to argue that esti-
mates are unbiased conditional on the sample selection criterion
(i.e., for the universe of published cases). However, Hughes and
Snyder (ibid., pp. 427-28) show clearly that
The phrase "the estimates are unbiased conditional on the
stage of litigation" must be interpreted cautiously. The
"conditional" estimates ... are not conditional in the statis-
tical sense of the term, since [they] place no restrictions on
the value of [the error term] .... Estimates . . . are condi-
tionally unbiased only to the extent that the set of claims
settled or litigated [or published] is assumed to be the pop-
ulation of interest in its own right, complete with a nor-
54 The factors they identified as influencing outcomes were (1) defend-
ant's organization type (industrial or nonindustrial); (2) whether written in-
structions were provided to the performance evaluator; (3) whether evaluation
used "trait" or "behavioral" model in assessing performance; (4) whether em-
ployer used "job analysis" in the evaluation system; and (5) whether results
were reviewed with employee (the first, or the negative, answer to each ques-
tion was associated with lower employer win rates).
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mally distributed error term, rather than the selected sub-
set of a larger population. "Conditional" estimation
requires assuming statistical independence between [publi-
cation and the win equation], an assumption that [is] ... at
odds with the self-selection features of the underlying the-
oretical model [such as Priest/Klein]. (Emphasis in origi-
nal)
In other words, if publication is correlated with any of the
variables of interest, the statistical properties of the error term
necessary to estimate discriinnant or logit analysis of outcomes
are not met.
E. Doctrinal Explanations for Caseload Growth
As we and others have pointed out, the federal employment
discrimination caseload has grown dramatically over the past
twenty years, at a rate several times faster than the rest of the fed-
eral civil caseload (Donohue and Siegelman, 1991). Some authors
have attributed this rapid increase to changes in legal doctrine that
create new rights for plaintiffs. For example, the American Law
Institute (1989: 1) suggests that "in recent years there has been an
'explosion' in the number of employment discrimination ... cases
filed in the federal courts. The tremendous growth in such cases
has been due primarily to landmark decisions by the U.S. and state
Supreme Courts, federal and state appellate and trial tribunals,
and recently enacted statutes." Similarly, the Equal Employment
Advisory Council (an employers' lobbying group) states (1990: 3)
that "there has been a tremendous increase in federal employment
discrimination litigation." In the Council's view, "this increased lit-
igation has been brought about by two primary factors-additional
statutory private rights of action created by Congress and the
courts plus the 1972 Title VII amendments that gave litigation au-
thority to the EEOC."'5 5
The gist of these legal or doctrinal explanations is that addi-
tional rights created by courts or by Congress are responsible for
the increase in litigation. The more plaintiffs' rights are given pro-
tection under the law, the argument goes, the more plaintiffs will
be in position to defend these rights through litigation, and hence
the greater the volume of lawsuits.
There are many potential flaws in this argument; here we con-
centrate only on whether it is supported by the facts. Suppose that
changes in legal doctrine were driving the increase in litigation we
have observed, as the doctrinal theories suggest. This should have
obvious implications for changes in the composition of cases. But
these implications are almost universally falsified by the available
data.
55 As we demonstrate elsewhere (Donohue and Siegelman, 1991), the ar-
gument that the EEOC bears any direct responsibility for the growth in cases
is almost certainly wrong.
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Using our nationwide sample of employment discrimination
cases described earlier, we can disaggregate the caseload by an (ad-
mittedly crude) measure of the "subject matter" or right being as-
serted.5 Doctrinal theories require that areas of the law in which
new rights have been created should be the source of most of the
caseload increase, while areas that have not seen new rights cre-
ated should experience no (or less) growth in litigation.
An obvious counter-example is provided by the disparate be-
havior of hiring and firing suits. The legal rules for proving dis-
crimination in such cases are identical.5 7 Yet, as we show else-
where (Donohue and Siegelman, 1991), almost all the growth in
cases filed has come from an increase in firing suits. This is clearly
at odds with a doctrinal explanation.
Moreover, most of the areas in which new plaintiff rights have
been created have, in fact, produced very little of the additional lit-
igation that doctrinal theories would predict. For example, accord-
ing to doctrinal theories, recognition of the disparate impact the-
ory of discrimination in Griggs v. Duke Power (1971)-perhaps the
most important innovation in employment discrimination doctrine
since the passage of Title VII-should be a major source of the
growth in litigation. In fact, however, the volume of disparate im-
pact cases has grown more slowly than the overall employment
discrimination caseload, and constitutes less than 5 percent of all
employment discrimination cases filed.58 Thus, Griggs could not
possibly be responsible for much of the growth in litigation.
5 9
Our analysis of sample selection effects in publication provides
a clue about why doctrinal explanations for the caseload growth
56 As noted earlier, the sample was randomly selected from all the cases
filed in a nonrandom group of seven cities that together encompass more than
25 percent of all employment discrimination cases filed. As we argue else-
where (Donohue and Siegelman, 1991), however, there are good reasons to
think that it contains enough internal variation to make it a relatively good
proxy for the caseload as a whole.
57 According to Schlei and Grossman (1979: 5), "numerous courts have
continued to apply the order and allocation of proof set forth in McDonnell
Douglas to discharge cases" (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation
Co., 1976; Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 1977). The rules defining discrimi-
natory behavior are thus essentially identical in the two kinds of employment
discrimination cases. Note that the Supreme Court has recently held that
§ 1981 protection extends only to contract formation (hiring) and not to on-
the-job discrimination such as harassment or promotion (Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 1989). Whether § 1981 covers firing has been left uncertain, but
the implications of this decision for the present discussion are not important,
since it occurred too late to have any effect on the volume of cases in the popu-
lation under study.
58 These data come from an analysis of our nationwide sample of 1,247
employment discrimination cases. In 1972-73, disparate impact cases made up
8.7 percent of all cases filed; in 1986-87, their share had fallen to only 3.7 per-
cent.
59 This is not to say that Griggs had no influence on employer behavior,
which could well have changed substantially to prevent future lawsuits under
a Griggs-type theory. The argument is only that Griggs is not responsible for
much of the observed growth in litigation.
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may miss the boat. Most legal academics work only with cases that
have published opinions. These cases tend to be those that raise
novel legal issues or fact situations. Thus, sample selection effects
may make it appear that novel legal issues are the source of the
growing caseload, when in fact the volume of unpublished cases
(which constitute 80-90 percent of all cases filed) is growing for
entirely different reasons.60
VII. CONCLUSION: REPRESENTATIVE OF WHAT?
Both theory and empirical work suggest that employment dis-
crimination cases with published opinions are unlike those without
them in certain systematic and important ways. We suggest that
the sample selection bias inherent in using published cases is gen-
erally likely to be important enough to warrant attention. In the
context of employment discrimination litigation, the occupational
distribution of plaintiffs, the kinds of discrimination being com-
plained about, the laws allegedly being violated, and the outcome
of litigation all differ significantly between published and unpub-
lished cases.6 1
Social scientists and legal academics interested in evidentiary
rules, precedent, judicial rhetoric and similar issues now have a
large and important body of employment discrimination cases with
published opinions on which to draw for evidence.6 2 We enthusias-
tically support such research. With care, legal cases with published
opinions can also be used to generate some useful conclusions
about the society from which they come. If we have any disagree-
ment, it is with scholars who restrict their sample to published
60 Eisenberg and Schwab (1989) develop a version of this argument in a
different context.
61 Moreover, we suspect that the differences we found between published
and unpublished cases would be even greater if we had used a stricter defini-
tion of "published" (inclusion in BNA, rather than in LEXIS, which publishes
all opinions submitted to it). For example, consider the following slip opinion,
reproduced in its entirety:
These actions came on to be heard on the motions of the defendants
for summary judgment, and the court having considered the plead-
ings in the actions, and having found that there is no genuine issue of
fact to be submitted to the trial court on Counts I and II, and having
concluded that defendants are entitled to judgments as a matter of
law, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that de-
fendants' motions for summary judgment on counts I and II are in all
respects, granted, and judgments are entered herein in the defend-
ants' favor and against the plaintiffs. And the court further having
determined that these would be inappropriate cases for the exercise
of our pendant jurisdiction, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, AD-
JUDGED AND DECREED that judgments be entered herein in the
defendants' favor dismissing Count III.
Slip Opinion No. 77 C 3511, Presley-Robinson v. Fredric (1979). Clearly, this
opinion would not be found in BNA.
62 For a superb example of research that uses social science to explain
and critique the law, without overgeneralizing from its sample, see Schultz
(1990).
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cases and then attempt to generalize from their results to all cases,
or to broader social phenomena, without considering the possibility
of sample selection bias.
We are certainly not advocating the abandonment of research
using published opinions, however. For one thing, the costs of us-
ing such data are obviously dramatically lower than attempting to
survey all cases: In the federal district courts, this is likely to re-
quire extended visits to a Federal Record Center or courthouse to
examine documents.63 We do want to suggest, however, that re-
searchers-including those doing qualitative work-need to make
more of an effort to correct for the ways in which focusing on
cases with published opinions yields unrepresentative results.64
63 The availability of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts' com-
plete records (the Integrated Database of the Federal Judicial Center) through
the Inter-University Consortium on Political and Social Research should at
least make it easier for interested researchers to locate unpublished case files
by subject matter. We take it as a promising sign that these data have already
begun to be used.
64 For researchers using quantitative methods, powerful econometric
techniques are now available in many statistical packages to correct for sample
selection bias. Such techniques are beyond the scope of this article, but two co-
gent and accessible applications in a legal context are Hughes and Snyder
(1989) and Schwab and Eisenberg (1990). Both give clear explanations of meth-
odology and interpretations of their results and cite other relevant work. An
excellent modern introduction to the econometrics of sample selection is
Greene (1990a). For a more critical assessment of sample selection correction
methods, and a sense of some of the possible alternatives, see Stolzenberg and
Relles (1990).
SIEGELMAN AND DONOHUE 1167
APPENDIX
We obtained a data tape from the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts (AO) that included all "employment civil rights" cases
filed between 1 July 1972 and 30 June 1987. The tape included all
cases still pending (open) as of 30 June 1987, but did not include
cases filed before 1 July 1972, even if they closed after this date.
In constructing the set of employment discrimination cases
with published opinions, one alternative would be simply to search
in LEXIS for each of the 4,310 cases on the AO tape that were filed
in the Northern District of Illinois. Instead, however, we took ad-
vantage of some sophisticated UNIX operating system software that
allows relatively easy comparisons of (matching between) files.
(More precise details are available from the authors on request.)
Our strategy, therefore, was to search the LEXIS database using as
broad a definition as possible of what constitutes employment dis-
crimination.6 5 The resulting list of cases was then compared with
the set of docket numbers on the AO tape, and all matching
docket numbers were recorded.6 Table Al presents details of the
precise search request used and the number of citations found.
The table shows that the search produced 3,817 citations dur-
ing the period comparable to that covered by the AO Tape. The ad-
justment between lines 9 and 10 was necessary because our search
term started picking up LEXIS cases in January 1972, while the AO
tape started six months later. We also picked up some citations to
cases filed after 31 March 1987. Line 10 corrects for this "slippage"
at either end of the data by eliminating cases filed outside of our
comparison period.
In addition, it is important to note that LEXIS uses the judicial
opinion as its unit of analysis, not the case. The same case might
produce more than one opinion, as the judge rules first on a mo-
tion to dismiss, then on a motion for summary judgment, then on
evidentiary issues, and ultimately on the final outcome of the case.
In fact, if one counts only unique docket numbers (thereby elimi-
nating multiple counting of cases with more than one opinion), the
number of citations falls from 3,817 to 3,058, a drop of 20 percent.
Put another way, the average case in our LEXIS sample contained
about 1.25 opinions. We therefore use the term "LEXIS cases" to re-
fer to unique docket numbers, reserving "citations" for the
65 An alternative strategy would be to frame a LEXIS search that would
come closest to approximating the population of employment discrimination
cases appearing on the AO tape. The advantages of this alternative strategy
are that it is easier to do; it also more closely approximates the manner in
which social scientists use LEXIS to find opinions. On the other hand, this
strategy will not yield as accurate a listing of employment discrimination be-
cause of the obvious problems of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness
that occur whenever one is trying to formulate the search terms.
66 As a check, we did undertake a LEXIS search for 179 of the cases on
the AO tape. The results substantiate our methodology, as discussed in detail
in note 40.
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Lib. = GenFed; File = Courts;
1. Court (Northern and Illinois) and
Date Aft 1971 and Discriminat! 2,943
2. or Title VII 137
3. or Equal Pay Act 3
4. or Rehabilitation Act 13
5. or 42 U.S.C. § 1981 28
6.' or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 1,404
7. or 42 U.S.C. § 206 1
8. or 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) 0
9. or [42 w/3 (1981 or 1983 or 2000(e))] 187
Total citations (opinions) found 4,716
10. Of which were opinions in cases filed after 6/31/72 and 3,817
before 4/1/87
11. Of which were unique cases 3,058
number of entries detected (including multiple opinions from the
same underlying case). In this article, we concentrate on cases
rather than citations.
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